Marital Fatalism/Maggie Gallagher

In the June 2006 issue of Reason there is a fascinating essay "Marital Mythology" disguised as a review of two new books, by Julian Sanchez. (The two books are Stephanie Coontz "Marriage, a History" and Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas' "Promises I can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Marriage Before Motherhood.") Julian is a very thoughtful guy; and I found this essay particularly interesting an example of the way in which contemporary liberalism (in this case classical liberalism i.e. libertarianism) is wrestling with marriage as a social institution.

It's a hard job for liberals (classical or otherwsie) because marriage and family are the last great preliberal social institution standing. People choose marriage, which fits into Liberalism, but they don't choose what marriage is (and one of our current tussles is who then gets to decide what marriage as a status is, and on what grounds)? Sanchez asks: When people choose to marry, or not to marry, or to have a child out of wedlock, or to divorce, on what grounds can any outsider judge this decision as right or wrong, given it expresses the revealed preferences of someone with more information than we have about particular circumstances?

e.g. "{T]he accounts given by the women themselves of their decision make it difficult to say glibly that one set of values or antoher is wrong, and need to be corrected. By thier lights they are responding rationaly to their circumstances. . .What seems rational for themother might not, of course, be in the best interests of the child. Yet neither is it obvious that once the child exists, marriage is in the best interests of the mother or child, given the qua.ity of the available fathers. . . the one thing all married couples shared, is a revealed preference for marriage: given all the detailed information each particular couples had about thier particular reltionahips, they decided to marry. . ."

One might as well, on this ground, abandon the idea of moral norm altogether. "Systematic attempts to alter the revealed preferences of individuals in a given society" would be a good law and econ definition of culture. By the terms Sanchez sets out culture itself appears to be an illegitimate enterprise. (Or does this line of reasoning apply only to marriage?)

It may surprise Sanchez to find that I agree with him that simplistic descriptions of the decline of marriage as only a values problem are, well simplistic. But I still would like to know, from Julian whether he thinks that it would be good if fewers children were born out of wedlock, and if more marriages lasted.

The oddest and most telling thing to me about Sanchez's essay is the pessimism he accepts and then reformulates in Hayeking terms:

"[Coontz] warns. . . 'just as we cannot organize modern political alliances through kinship ties. . .we can never reinstate marriage as the primary source of commitment and caregiving in the modern world. For beter or worse, we must adjust our personal expectations and social support system to this new reality.'" [MG: she's talking here about a vast expansion of the welfare state on a marriage neutral basis btw]

SAnchez continues "That conclusion may seem excessively fatalistic, especially given Coontz's own chronicle of marriage's ability to adapt to changing circumstances. But it does encapsulate a core piece of Hayekian wisdom. Organic social institutions grow and evolve from the bottom up, as individuals change their behavior in light of the circumstances they perceive on the ground. Attempts to freeze or correct them in accordance with a Gran Plan--a vision of how they ought to function that views change as a dangerous deviation from an ideal-are no more likely to succeed for marriages than for markets."

(I cannot resist noting here as a sideline that 'institutions must change from the ground up', unless a liberal Massachusetts judge decides to order them changed from the top down, in which case resistance is apparently also futile, and attempts to interfere with this top down rule reformulation in the only possible way (a constitutional amendment) gets recast as a nonHayekian lack of respect for the bottom up nature of social institutions. . .)

But I digress. Here's what striking to me: Libertarians tend to be let's say, not pessimistic about much, theoretically. Why so fatalistic about the possiblity of reducing unwed childbearing or divorce? Sanchez I think lapses into marital fatalism because he cannot really embrace the idea that increasing number of children born out of marriage (or experiencing divorce) is a good thing, so it must be a Complex Thing, about which external judgments are not possible. He can't really bring himself to condemn the idea of marriage education for the poor as horrible, so he mus explain (before we try it) that it cannot possibly help. What is the empirical basis for this extreme fatalism? The white jacket of Reason and Science gets donned pretty selectively in these kinds of discussions, and not just with Sanchez.

I don't even think Stephanie Coontz (whom I've spent a long career debating family diversity with) really thinks that very high levels of divorce and unmarried childbearing are good things. So she also must adopt complicated explanations for why changes are too complex to be grabbled with, either by culture or public policy: they are irrevesible. Marriage is flux. Lie back and think of tax policy.

Stephanie is a democratic socialist, so her extreme pessimism is both natural and in her political self interest. What is the classical liberals' excuse?
posted by maggie at 3:06 PM | Link |

13 Comments:

At 5/20/2006 9:48 PM, Lynn Gazis-Sax said...

"Libertarians tend to be let's say, not pessimistic about much, theoretically."

Except government programs.

 

At 5/21/2006 5:00 PM, Julian said...

First, thanks for this thoughtful reply; it's gratifying to have a piece engaged by someone who figures so prominently in these debates.

Since you asked: Sure; I'd like to see more marriages last and fewer children born out of wedlock, though in the latter case it seems as though more women's postponing childbearing until they're settled and mature enough to have picked suitable spouses (as opposed to their still having the kids young and marrying the fathers) would be the preferable way for that to happen. Or, to be a little more precise, in those (many) cases where a couple's marrying would yield a more stable and healthy environment for the child, I would (of course) be glad to see that happen. I thought something like that was implicit in the various things I said about ways marriage often benefits kids.

A couple points. First, I don't think libertarian pessimism about the prospect of solving social problems through *well-intentioned government social programs* (as opposed to some kind of more generally pessimistic worldview) is very unusual at all. I might go so far as to say it's the distinguishing feature of libertarian thinking... though it was less of a distinguishing feature back in those halcyon days when conservatives tended to share it. (I suppose that's one way I *do* think things were better in the 50s...)

Let me also emphasize that the basis for my skepticism about the wisdom of second guessing revealed preferences isn't just a kind of general Millian confidence in people's general ability to judge best their own needs and interests--though I'll plead guilty to harboring a measure of that. Rather, it was rooted in the thought that the particular accounts the women themselves give of why they aren't marrying the fathers of their children suggest that they often have at least prima facie good reasons for not doing so, and the lack of appropriate respect for the idea of marriage, or even lack of the kind of "relationship skills" that programs funded by the Healthy Marriage Initiative seek to teach, are not the central problem--a point with which Maggie herself seemed to agree at least somewhat. (As for giving up on norms, need I really point out that the way genuine evolved norms and individual preferences reciprocally shape and interact with each other is different from an attempt to shape preferences through government-sponsored classes and public awareness campaigns?)

I do say, incidentally, that insofar as it's federal rather than state or local government spending money trying to help families stay together (probably suboptimal, but that's another issue), it probably isn't, in itself, doing any *harm* to make available some kind of voluntary, non-intrusive class that advises people who are eager to make their relationships work. (Though had I more time to do a broader piece on the topic outside the context of a book review, I would have been interested to visit some of the programs, especially those run by faith-based initiatives, to see what they're actually teaching; if we're using tax-money to pitch some sort of specifically theologically-frieghted view of how to conduct relationships on people, I might have separate issues with that.) I just think the stories the women themselves tell give us ample reason to think that the problems with marriage are to a large extent epiphenomenal--a function of a series of other problems with violence, drugs, and high male-incarceration rates--and so trying to cure the illness by focusing on one particular symptom is likely to be of limited usefulness at best and a seductive distraction at worst. I suppose we'll see soon enough.

Well, there's my pessimism; but I also tried to separate myself, at least a bit, from Coontz's particularly extreme brand of fatalism, which frankly struck me as odd in light of her own findings. Where she seemed to be saying "Well, marriage is over, let's just cope," I was trying to say "Look, marriage has gone through all these upheavals and changes that Coontz herself chronicles, and maybe before carving the tombstone, we should consider the possibility that we're just in another period of change and adjustment: People on the ground will adapt the institution, but it will survive... even if what comes out on the other end doesn't look like the 1950s version any more than 1950s marriage looked like 1650s marriage or 350 BCE marriage."


On the parenthetical about imposing gay marriage by judicial fiat: My point was that marriage has changed in all these ways over the centuries, and so saying that we're going to have the law take a snapshot of the most recent vintage and freeze it there (and on the rather bizarre grounds that this relatively novel variant is "traditional" marriage) isn't any less "technocratic" than saying it's got to look some other way.

To extend an analogy I used in the piece: It's as though we'd had a free market for a few hundred years, and then legislators said: "Ok, there! Henceforth, the firms currently in existence will produce the same quantities of goods, and sell them at the same price." And if, after a bit of this, someone suggested that perhaps we should let new firms form and choose how much to sell at what price, we said "No, no, you're tampering with the evolved wisdom of the market!"

If individual communities and churches could decide what to recognize as a "marriage," gay marriage would already be pervasive. Making it a matter of law that those choices don't get to count is no less a case of "imposing" than saying they will count.

 

At 5/21/2006 9:32 PM, Steven Horwitz said...

Maggie,

The comments section is too long for a proper response to your last question, so instead, I'll point you to a recent publication of mine that attempts to lay out a Hayekian (perhaps libertarian) theory of the family that expands on some of the things Julian argues in his essay. I'd be curious as to your take on my argument. You can find it here.

 

At 5/21/2006 9:50 PM, SPorcupine said...

Classic liberals don't merely resist strong socializing institutions: they have a hard time imagining their existence. It's all individual vs. government. It's all liberty vs. coercion. And it's all individuals-who-already-have preferences.

As a result, any movement for more and stronger marriages must be about forcing people who don't want to be married to be married anyway.

It has to be about forcing them because the starting assumption is that on core values, people can't be changed. You can't convince them, give persuasive reasons, offer models, demonstrate benefits, or otherwise reshape their understanding of how they want to live.

Of course, it's a theory run amok. It's one thing to say government must be deeply restrained and limited in dealing with diverse beliefs. It's quite another to pretend every possible effort to change individual behavior is the same as brutal tyranny, no matter what method or institution make the effort. The first is where classic liberalisim is true and valuable: the second is where it can become false, destructive, and even nutty.

 

At 5/21/2006 10:49 PM, Nicholas Rosen said...

Julian Sanchez has replied to Maggie Gallagher at http://reason.com/hitandrun; I belive that both of them have legitimate points worthy of consideration.

I'll reply to SPorcupine that his description of what classical liberals believe does not at all correspond to what I believe, or what I think that most other classical liberals believe.

 

At 5/21/2006 11:56 PM, Anonymous said...

how it is difficult ... I prefer to live and enjoy ..

 

At 5/21/2006 11:58 PM, Olga said...

how it is difficult ... I prefer to live and enjoy ..

 

At 5/22/2006 1:00 AM, Marty said...

Well put sporcupine. While i won't speak to the libertarian issue here, it has been all too common during recent political debates that somehow any attempt by the State to provide an incentive for a particular action or behavior is twisted into outright opression by those who could just as easily say no.

 

At 5/22/2006 9:19 AM, Steven Horwitz said...

Let me also agree with Nicolas Rosen's last point. And let me also suggest to SPorcupine that the paper of mine cited in the comment above speaks *directly* to that point. For example:

"The task this paper sets itself is to demonstrate the errors of Hodgson’s argument by outlining a ‘Hayekian’ theory of the family. The key to that task is that Hodgson’s claim that Hayekians believe that ‘the market is the best way of ordering all socioeconomic activities’ is simply false. Hodgson conveniently ignores Hayek’s distinction between orders and organisations (or ‘cosmos’ and ‘taxis’) as well as his scattered remarks in The Fatal Conceit ifferentiating between the ‘micro’ order and the ‘macro’ order. There is nothing in Hayek’s social theory to suggest that institutions such as the family, or firms, or other components of civil society, are unnecessary given the
supposed relentless march of ‘market individualism’. To the contrary, in agreement with the perspective Hodgson himself develops in his book cited earlier, such nonmarket institutions play essential and irreplaceable roles in any desirable social order. In what follows, I hope to sketch out the functions of the family in a Hayekian conception of the Great Society."

Classical liberals can and do have a theory of social institutions other than those of state and market.

 

At 5/22/2006 9:42 AM, fidelity said...

Dear Maggie:

Great comment. As you know, I have a elucidated one way that true liberals might grapple with the idea of marriage and family.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig7/safranek1.html

Part of the key issue today with regard to children and child bearing is that we do not see them for the asset or liability that they are. I do not want them to be seen totally that way, but they should be seen in that way to some extent - because they are.

Therefore, society needs to find a way to make those most responsible for the child becoming an asset or a liability responsible for such, i.e. parents should get credit and debits for it in some way.

The failure to do so is at the heart of the unwed marriage issue and even the failure of married parents to fulfill their responsibilities.

Children are, from an economic perspective, a long term asset or liability. Whether they become one or the other takes at least 20-25 years (and in some ways longer). During the entire first 18-20 years the overwhelming cost of such is borne by parents unless they lack the assets to bear it. After the 18-20 years, all of the economic value of such investment is taken by the state first in the form of taxes.

Any excess, if any, may be given to the parents out of charity on the part of the kids.

The crisis is clear. I think a solution is clearer for economists than they want to admit.

 

At 5/22/2006 9:52 AM, Anonymous said...

Republican laissez faire economics poses more of a threat to marriages and people and has destroyed more marriages and more lives than any issue that Republicans can trump up during an election season. We have come to the 2006 campaign season so I expect to hear the Republicans bring up every social authoritarian issue that they can gather votes in the fall.

GOP means Going Out of Power.

 

At 5/22/2006 9:25 PM, Anonymous said...

Very stimulating conversation.

What is not asked is why was marriage the social construction it was up until 1950 or so. When Julian says:

"Sure; I'd like to see more marriages last and fewer children born out of wedlock, though in the latter case it seems as though more women's postponing childbearing until they're settled and mature enough to have picked suitable spouses (as opposed to their still having the kids young and marrying the fathers) would be the preferable way for that to happen."

Isn't he really saying, "what we had before, a social rite call marriage, protected women and children from exploitation by men and helped create a more civilized society"? Can't we all look at the deconstructionism since the 1950's and conclude, probably, that demoting the constructive force of marriage (and the institutions which support them like religions) actually created a real harm for children, women and for our society?

I think the intellectual crowd may choose fatalism because it allows them to avoid facing an important error which has been made: namely, that a pretty good institution was devalued impulsively and destructively by an intellectual class. This intellectual class poorly predicted the future cost of devaluing marriage.

To be anything but fatalistic about marriage education and marriage restoration is a tacit acknowledgement that the social sciences poorly informed the masses some 50 years ago.

I disagree with sporcupine about liberalism. Liberalism for me is an attempt to use the government to remedy the obvious flaws of humanity. Liberalism, properly applied, seeks to improve the human condition through social policy when individualism, family, market forces and culture fail. Where properly applied, liberalism is open to critiques of its efforts because human good is it's ultimate goal. Unfortunately, liberalism sees it's programs and policies as intrinsically creating human good and has difficulty changing when those programs and policies are demonstrated to cause harm. In that regard they cease to be liberal and instead become reactionary. It is the program for the program's sake, it is the policy for the policy's sake; measuring whether a human good is obtained falls by the wayside.

This is true of their attempts to deconstruct marriage and assume that other social programs and institutions would easily make up for what marriage did. Now we know that the policy of deconstruction has failed. A true liberal would embrace that information and realistically (even optimistically) apply what had worked prior to the deconstruction: stable marriages make for happy women, healthy children, and responsible men...and a more civilized society.

That liberal might, unless doing so might prove how misled we all were and what a high price we have all paid. At such a point it might be easier to choose to be a marital fatalist instead.

David Blakeslee

 

At 5/24/2006 12:22 AM, José Solano said...

—
"Can't we all look at the deconstructionism since the 1950's and conclude, probably, that demoting the constructive force of marriage (and the institutions which support them like religions) actually created a real harm for children, women and for our society?"

" A true liberal would embrace that information and realistically (even optimistically) apply what had worked prior to the deconstruction: stable marriages make for happy women, healthy children, and responsible men...and a more civilized society."

David Blakeslee once again strikes at the core of the problem. I've always seen myself as a classical and true liberal, as Blakeslee describes, and a Democrat at that. We have to recognize what has failed because of the self-centered myopic extremists and now blaze trails "back to the future," so to speak, to reconstruct what has been senselessly torn down.

 

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