New Study: Black Family Ties Make Middle Class Status Fragile

"Sibling ties that cross the socioeconomic divide significantly affect the stability and well-being of black middle-classAmericans. That is according to a new Northwestern University study that further illustrates the fragility of the black middle class.

Blacks teetering at the lower end of the middle-class spectrum are two and a half times as likely to have a low-income sibling as whites in the same socioeconomic bracket, the study shows. They also are four times as likely to have been poor when they were young, suggesting the relatively recent rise of many blacks to middle-class status.

"Basically the study shows that blacks in the lower middle class are much less likely to have kin to call on when an occasion arises in which they need, say, quick cash for a hospital bill or to fix a car," says Northwestern’s Mary Pattillo, chair and professor of sociology at the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences and co-investigator of the study. "And they are much more likely to have kin calling upon them for financial and other assistance."

The study, "Poverty in the Family: Race, Siblings and Socioeconomic Heterogenity," by Pattillo and Colleen Heflin, University of Kentucky, will be published in the December issue of Social Science Research. . .

The new study locates individual attainment within the context of the extended family, suggesting an unrecognized layer of inequality by race that helps explain the literature showing the economic discrepancies between black and white Americans and the higher risk of downward mobility for African Americans. . ."

posted by maggie at 7:18 PM | Link | 0 comments

Following a “Higher Law” in Massachusetts

Following a “Higher Law” in Massachusetts

More interesting than the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling that it cannot force the state legislature to do its constitutional duty, has been some of the reaction from amendment opponents reported in this story from the Boston Globe. Proponents of the amendment are correct to frame the issue as a matter of whether the rule of law will be respected in Massachusetts.

One thing that’s interesting in the response is the implicit invocation of a “higher law” that, for the amendment’s opponents, justifies ignoring a constitutional mandate. They seem to believe that an ideological commitment to pure equality trumps any substantive or procedural limitation in the state constitution.

Intimations of this way of thinking appeared in the earlier opinion of two members of the Court who warned that even if the proposed marriage amendment were enacted it might still be invalid because it “purposefully discriminates against an oppressed and disfavored minority of our citizens in direct contravention of the principles of liberty and equality.” This thought process is recurring in response to this week’s SJC decision. Thus, for instance, Senate minority leader Brian P. Lees is reported in the Globe story to say that he has a “duty to vote against a measure that would discriminate against a minority group [which] trumped the court’s findings.” A lobbyist for the Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus is quoted in the same story as saying: “We know that if the Legislature votes on the amendment, we will lose this year and next year, and it will go to the ballot, where it will likely pass.” Thus, her organization is still “lobbying legislators to again avoid a vote on Tuesday.”

We all ought to hope the legislature will do the right thing and allow a vote. The precedent of allowing ideological commitments to trump officials’ oaths of office bodes only ill by raising the specter of “a government of laws and not of men” (Mass. Const. Art. XXX) that John Adams’ constitution tried to prevent.

Of course, there is also some irony in the Court’s newfound enthusiasm for separation of powers. It would have been more helpful if that principle had been seriously considered when the Court decided to redefine marriage in 2003. A cynic might even say that the obviously correct decision of the Court was affected by a belief that this decision will have no practical effect because the legislative leadership is intent on not allowing a vote. Let’s hope that’s not the case.
posted by William Duncan at 2:53 PM | Link | 0 comments

Wisconsin Attorney General Opinion

Yesterday, the attorney general of Wisconsin issued an opinion regarding the effect of the recently enacted state marriage amendment on local domestic partnership ordinances. The opinion concludes that the city of Madison’s domestic partnership ordinance (which provides some employment related benefits to partners of public employees) does not conflict with the language of the amendment that “[a] legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this state.”

The opinion reasons that “substantially similar” means something close to virtually identical to marriage. Since Madison’s domestic partnership ordinance and the marriage law have in common only the qualifications that the partners must be competent adults who are not currently married, it is not "substantially similar" to marriage. Additionally, the opinion notes that the ordinance does not provide access to a significant number of benefits provided to married couples by state law.

Although it does not appear the city of Madison had asked about it, the opinion also says that the amendment has no effect on benefits packages offered to partners of employees by private companies.
posted by William Duncan at 2:12 PM | Link | 0 comments

Massachusetts SJC Ruling and Federal Lawsuit

As has been pointed out to me, the SJC ruling seems to give momentum to the federal lawsuit against Massachusetts legislators for denying Massachusetts voters their right to participate in the political process as outlined in the state’s constitution, since this week’s ruling establishes the clear constitutional duty of legislators to allow a vote.
posted by William Duncan at 2:10 PM | Link | 0 comments

Massachusetts Court Can’t Enforce Legislature’s Constitutional Duty

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court turned away a request by the governor and others that the state legislature be required to vote on a proposed amendment to the state constitution that would define marriage as the union of a man and a woman.

Article 48 of the Massachusetts Constitution requires the legislature to vote on proposed amendments that arise by initiative. If the amendments receive ¼ of the votes of the members of the legislature in two successive sessions, it is placed on the ballot in the next general election for voter approval.

The plaintiffs in today’s case had signed the initiative petition for the proposed marriage amendment. Opponents of the amendment have fiercely resisted a substantive vote on the amendment, possibly out of fear that a popular vote would moot the Supreme Judicial Court’s redefinition of marriage. When it became clear that the legislature was not going to hold a substantive vote on the amendment, they sought to have the Supreme Judicial Court either require a legislative vote, or alternatively, place the amendment on the next.

The court held (the case is Doyle v. Secretary of the Commonwealth) that it is “beyond serious debate” that the Massachusetts Constitution creates a legislative duty for the legislature to hold a substantive vote on the amendment. The court, however, held that the constitution does not allow a judicial order to the legislature to allow the vote or an order to the Secretary of the Commonwealth to place the amendment on the ballot, absent a legislative vote.

I briefly discuss the Massachusetts situation in this essay on lawlessness in the ongoing marriage debate.
posted by William Duncan at 1:33 PM | Link | 12 comments